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Illiberal Media and Popular Constitution Making in Turkey
1. Introduction
Popular constitution making, a process that allows for public participation as opposed to a
handful of elites writing a fundamental social contract behind closed doors and imposing
it on the rest of society, is tricky. It sounds like a noble idea in theory, but it is difficult to
execute effectively, efficiently, and, most importantly, democratically. Even trickier are
the roles of publicity and media in popular constitution making. What are the
consequences of reporting during the drafting of a new constitution? In what ways could
the media lend legitimacy to the process by informing the public and incorporating public
opinion into the drafting of a constitution? Coupled with the rise of new media
technologies, an ideal of participatory constitution making (and an active role for the
media) may seem desirable, not to mention attainable, but there are myriad ways to
participate, and basing a constitution on popular opinion could easily devolve into a
majority of 50 percent plus one that imposes its will on the rest. The bare minimum,
ideally, is to expect journalists to report on facts without bowing to political or economic
pressures, but even that is easier said than done. For which audiences are these
journalistic facts intended? For those leaders drafting the new constitution or the public at
large?
These are not easy questions to answer empirically, not only because media and
communications are often neglected in studies of constitution making, but also because
the relationship between the two is hard to ascertain precisely. Popular constitution
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making relies on the principle that the legitimacy of constitutions reflects the process by
which they are drafted as much as their content. The media are expected to play a
weighty and presumably unbiased role in linking and amplifying what happens during the
process. But when some of the oldest and most resilient constitutions around the world
were drafted, journalism was stridently partisan, and not at all an objective, even-handed
intermediary.1 The specific role of media in more contemporary examples of (popular)
constitution making also varies significantly depending on the context in question.2
In liberal democracies, or those that aspire to become liberal-democratic, the
media are expected to report without bias, keep the public informed, and put pressure on
decision makers.3 In more autocratic regimes, the media usually function to signal the
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Schudson, “The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,” Journalism 2, no. 2 (2001):
149–70.
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political power of elites to citizens while shaping the underlying belief structures and
values of the public.4 Normative theories aside, in any political system, the media
constitute a semi-autonomous institution whose positioning vis-à-vis the political and
economic fields, not to mention their own internal dynamics, shape the news.5 On the one
hand, the state tries to constrain the voices and viewpoints presented in the media by
providing official narratives, regulating speech, and controlling the political economy of
the news industry. On the other hand, commercial pressure shapes and limits the range of
content and views in the media considerably.6 There are also historically established
journalistic norms and practices that determine the autonomy of the profession and
diversity of public narratives in a given country (e.g., the professionalization of

www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.001.0001/oxfordhb
-9780199793471-e-73 (accessed March 8, 2019).
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Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1994).
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journalism, public service orientation in reporting, limited interference from the state, and
legal protections of speech, to name a few).7
What can we then learn about the media’s role in popular constitution making
from Turkey’s 2011–2013 process? For one, this case demonstrates, yet again, how
messy and complicated the role of media is in the process of democratization, especially
when it comes to collectively agreeing upon the fundamental principles of a nationwide
contract such as a constitution. Turkey has always been a so-called hybrid regime, one
that combines democratic and authoritarian elements,8 but the regime of the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) represents a particular epoch in
which political leaders not only have deliberately manipulated democratic institutions for
their own gains, but also attempted to “create [their] own tutelage over democratic
politics.”9 Even though Turkey’s media system was far from perfect prior to the AKP’s
tenure, the consolidation of an illiberal media environment—one that purportedly has a
plurality of news sources and viewpoints, but is also intimately tied to the government
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and restricted to binary narratives—distinguishes this era. The period from 2011 to 2013
substantiated, over and over again, the AKP’s tight control over media and its overall
autocratic inclinations. If the attempt at popular constitution making evidences an
anomaly in what is otherwise a traditional case of constitutional imposition, as Petersen
and Yanaşmayan suggest in this volume, the Turkish press mediated this anomaly against
the background of a rapidly degenerating media system.10
Turkey’s rare attempt to create an inclusive, participatory, consensus-driven
political process with an illiberal media calls into question some of the taken-for-granted
assumptions about the relationship between democracy and media, such as that
transparency is key to democratic decision making, that diversity of viewpoints leads to
better public debates, and that participatory processes are essentially more democratic.
Rather than fundamentally challenging the significance of these principles (transparency,
diversity, and participation), Turkey’s experience serves as a reminder that autocrats can
easily appropriate democratic discourses and practices for their own ends, and the media
are not powerful enough to be a bulwark against creeping authoritarianism.
Based on a combination of newspaper content analysis and institutional history, I
identify three distinct phases in the 2011–2013 period when journalists in Turkey, already
quite limited in their capacity to report news, tried to cover this ambitious democratic
experiment and its failure. First, in the early days of the Constitutional Conciliation
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Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK), the AUK’s tight control over the
public narrative seems to have taken on an undemocratic tone (especially in contrast to
their stated commitment to an inclusive procedure), yet it resulted in a mostly neutral
coverage that regularly emphasized the values of a democratic process. Second, when the
AUK began to negotiate over how to draft the new constitution, the weakening of press
control led to ostensibly more independent coverage of the new constitution, albeit in a
way that simplified and polarized the debate over contested topics instead of inviting a
multi-perspectival dialogue. Finally, as the AUK’s work was derailed by failing to reach
an agreement on key topics, the significance of which was the shift to a presidential
system, the press coverage seemed to revert back to what it had already learned to do
well in general, that is, to bifurcate the narrative as pro- or anti-AKP, or more precisely,
as pro- or anti- the political leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.11
In the following, I first present a brief overview of how the AKP government has
established a new media environment by suppressing liberal-critical voices, fortifying its
own media bloc, and pushing its own narratives to shape the news agenda. Then I discuss
how the AUK intended to break out of the polarized and repressed news cycles by
instituting control over reporting on the new constitution. Finally, I examine how the
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press coverage less inhibited by the AUK ended up promoting simpler and more divisive
narratives. Toward the end of the constitution-making process, the highly polarized,
illiberal media amplified the impasse the commission was already experiencing, and
reduced the whole process to a debate over the AKP’s proposal for a presidential system.

2. The Making of Illiberal Media in Turkey
Government pressure over media, self-censorship among journalists, tight alignment with
state ideology, and political instrumentalization of the press have a long history in
Turkey. During the AKP’s single-party rule, however, not only have press–state relations,
media ownership structures, and journalistic cultures transformed in myriad ways, but
also the shift in political ideologies (from secular-nationalist to Islamist-nationalist) has
challenged the existing rules and norms in the profession.12 In this section, I first present a
brief history of the media environment in Turkey prior to the AKP era, and then detail
how the AKP government constructed a new, illiberal media system over the last fifteen
years or so.

2.1 Turkey’s Media System prior to 2002
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Television Journalism in Turkey,” Media, Culture & Society (2018), available at
https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718799400 (accessed March 29, 2019).
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The active participation of Turkey’s journalists in political life dates back to the late
nineteenth century.13 Such political engagement either resulted in highly intimate
relations between the press and the government, or was repeatedly quashed if it was
deemed too critical. Starting with the single-party years of the republican period (1923–
45), many journalists joined the ranks of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi, CHP).14 Cumhuriyet, for example, now a left-of-center newspaper, was
founded soon after the republic was established under the auspices of the CHP and
Atatürk. Journalists who were close to the party propagated the modernizing reforms of
the regime in their newspapers. Some news outlets and journalists were critical of the
government, especially during the attempts to form a multi-party regime in the years
before 1945, but a critical press was either shut down or quite limited by the laws
regulating political opposition.
The post-1945 multi-party regime, especially the era of the Democratic Party
(Demokrat Parti, DP), offered “both the carrot and the stick” to the press.15 On the one
hand, a new Press Law was instituted in 1950 to recognize the freedom of the press and
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journalists’ right to unionize. On the other hand, authoritarian clauses were added to
enable the government to shut down publications and impose prison terms on
journalists.16 Party officials continued establishing clientelistic relationships with media
owners and individual journalists. The DP government also transformed public radio into
a political apparatus that was used both to spread party propaganda and to silence
critics.17
Immediately after the 1960 coup d’état brought down the DP government, the
military seized power over the press. Yunus Emre and Burak Cop report that the mass
media played a critical role during the 1961 constitutional referendum. In order to
increase voter turnout and encourage massive support for the new constitution, the press
regularly covered declarations of “yes” votes.18 In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey’s mass
media started moving more toward television broadcasting, as the Turkish Radio and
Broadcasting Corporation (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu, TRT) quickly expanded
across the country. Especially in the 1970s, every new government tried to seize control
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of TRT, and, eventually, the next coup in 1980 brought TRT under the control of the
military.19
Turkey’s media system has traditionally been identified as a “polarized pluralistic
model,” a category that also includes countries such as France, Greece, Spain, Italy, and
Portugal. Polarized pluralist media systems, in general, tend to have limited newspaper
circulation, politicized media organizations (with links to political parties or with clear
political leanings), and an under-professionalized journalistic workforce.20 The post-coup
liberalization of Turkey’s economy in the 1980s enabled a range of new commercial
actors to emerge (especially in broadcast),21 but journalism has been consistently
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influenced by political parties22 and aligned with dominant state narratives.23 As Ozan
Aşık observes, “[T]he secularist consensus … served as the primary entity defining what
should be perceived as the public interest and common good” in the press up until the
early 2000s.24 Despite a proliferation of publications with various political orientations in
the 1990s, Turkey’s mainstream media remained closely aligned with state ideology, a
fact most significantly reflected in the coverage of Kurdish issues and the conflict with
the Kurdistan's Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) since 1983. Not only
was the word “Kurdish” tacitly banned in the mainstream media until the 1990s, but
many journalists who failed to follow this rule faced legal repercussions.25 Even though
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Turkish Studies 11, no. 4 (2010): 579–611.
23
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the AKP’s early years seemed to have increased the visibility of Kurds in the media via
the government’s official recognition of Kurdishness as a distinct identity and the
opening of a Kurdish-language television channel, the AKP government has continued
cracking down on Kurdish cultural and political expression throughout its tenure.

2.2 The AKP Era (2002 onwards)
After the liberalization wave in the industry, particularly in the 1990s, Turkey’s
mainstream media became overwhelmed by a combination of clientelism—in which
media owners relied on state resources to become competitive in non-media fields—and a
corporatist structure—in which companies needed to cater to multiple audiences.26 This
existing system enabled the AKP government to tame the media landscape and even
create its own AKP-friendly media bloc (sometimes referred to as yandaş
[partisan/advocate] media). Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, for example, argue
that the AKP government controls what they call “media autocracy” through neoliberal

26

Christian Christensen, “Breaking the News: Concentration of Ownership, the Fall of

Unions and Government Legislation in Turkey,” Global Media and Communication 3,
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the 2011 Turkish Elections,” International Journal of Press/Politics 19, no. 3 (2014):
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measures such as conglomerate pressure, judicial suppression, online banishment,
surveillance defamation, and accreditation discrimination.27 Bilge Yeşil suggests that the
AKP exploited this historical and structural continuity in media–government
relationships to cultivate the neoliberal authoritarian state of present-day Turkey.28
The AKP’s early tenure, which overlapped with the aftermath of the 2001
economic crisis in the country, focused on realigning the extant corporatist–clientelist
media environment with the interests of the party.29 A couple of years after Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan came to power, some of the bankrupt media companies were taken over by the
Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF), a regulatory
body under the prime minister’s office. Existing media moguls—the Doğan Group, for
example—jumped on this opportunity to acquire new outlets, thereby strengthening their
dominance in the industry. It was not unusual for the TMSF, however, to take over a
media company only to hand it over to an AKP-friendly bidder. In 2007, the Ciner
Group, which included the popular newspapers Sabah and Takvim and one of the most

27

Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, “Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a

Model of Neoliberal Media Autocracy,” Middle East Journal of Culture and
Communication 5, no. 3 (2012): 302–21.
28
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popular national TV channels, ATV, was sold to the sole bidder, Turkuvaz Media, owned
by the Çalık Group, which was then run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak.30 There
were brand new players, such as the Çalık, İpek-Koza, and Sancak groups, which entered
the field of media to cozy up to the government. They were not shy about it, either—
Sancak Holding’s CEO, Ethem Sancak, openly admitted that it was his support for the
AKP that led him into the media industry.31
The confiscation and sale of financially challenged companies to pro-AKP
enterprises in the 2004–2008 period were not the only steps toward the making of a proAKP media environment.32 The incestuous ties between media companies and political
elites were further solidified via public procurement contracts. Large holding companies
with interests in construction, energy, transportation, finance, and tourism regarded media
properties as “a levy that must be paid to ensure continued access to government

30
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31
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contracts.”33 In order to continue benefitting from government bids and favors, media
owners repeatedly interfered in editorial decisions and restricted criticism of the AKP
government in the late 2000s.34 In addition to these political-economic interventions, the
early tenure of the AKP government also ushered in the appointment of new managers,
editors, and pundits with clear pro-AKP views, despite the fact that most of them had no
prior background in journalism.35 It is important to note that all of these changes took
place alongside the strengthening of a tightly networked group of media outlets following
the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who at that time had a political-economic alliance
with the AKP.
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Media independence was further curtailed with the prosecution of several
journalists under the Anti-Terror Law, part of two major political investigations known as
Ergenekon (2007), a reference to an alleged shadow organization plotting against the
government, and Balyoz (“Sledgehammer”) (2010), after the code-name of a purported
coup plot, 36 Some journalists, accused of “collaborating with the Ergenekon
organization,” were imprisoned even without trial. In addition to the chilling effect this
had on reporters and media managers when it came to criticizing the AKP, the
government’s regular wiretapping and raiding of news organizations undermined the
privacy of reporters and discredited their professional standing in society.37 The use of the
Anti-Terror Law to prosecute journalists was not limited to the cases of Ergenekon and
Balyoz. Since 2009 dozens of journalists and editors from the Kurdish media have been
arrested on the grounds of membership in the Kurdistan Communities Union (Kürdistan
Topluluklar Birliği, KCK), thereby routinely criminalizing reporting on Kurdish rights
and criticism of the Turkish military.38
In 2009 the AKP government struck an obvious blow against a critical media
giant in the form of an exorbitant tax fine. After the Doğan Group’s flagship newspapers
Hürriyet and Milliyet covered a German court case in which several Turkish citizens with
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ties to the AKP leadership were accused of misappropriating tens of millions of dollars
from Deniz Feneri, a Turkish charity, Erdoğan first called for a boycott of the media
company. The Doğan Group was then hit with a $500 million tax fine, which was
followed by an additional $2.5 billion fine a few months later. The combined tax levy
nearly equalled the company’s total assets, thereby posing an existential threat to its
survival. The Doğan Group immediately appealed the charges, while also taking
measures to appease then-Prime Minister Erdoğan. The chairman of the company, Aydin
Doğan, stepped down, followed by the resignation of Ertuğrul Özkök, the editor-in-chief
of its flagship daily newspaper Hürriyet.39 In 2010 and 2011, the company sacked some
of the critical columnists from the mainstream papers Hürriyet and Radikal, and
eventually sold two other newspapers, Milliyet and Vatan, to a holding company with
strong ties to the government.40
Following the AKP’s election victory in 2011, the intimate relationship between
media owners and the government, which depended on complicity, censorship, and
outright control, became so obvious that it simply could not be denied. As Yeşil
evocatively notes, loyal businessmen who have entered the media industry since 2004
“were not simply motivated by prospects of receiving favors from the government, but
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they were also ‘doing favors for the government.’”41 Frequent defamation claims by
politicians against journalists, along with increasing self-censorship or censorship by
editors due to fears of repercussions, put major pressure on media coverage. A new wave
of resignations and dismissals of critical voices from the mainstream media continued
through 2011. Journalist Banu Güven, for example, was fired by the Doğuş-owned NTV
in 2011 for her criticism of the AKP’s stance on the Kurdish issue.42 Following his
dismissal from NTV in 2011, veteran journalist Can Dündar proclaimed the “dawn of a
new era in Turkey’s media field” that was marked by a “widespread purge, a cleanup.”43
According to Turkey-based Bianet (Independent Communications Network), 104
journalists were in jail in 2011.44 By way of contrast, according to the Committee to

41

Yeşil, Media in New Turkey, 106.

42

Ayse Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship

between Politics, Religion and Business (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014).
43

Yeşil, “Press Censorship in Turkey.”

44

Emel Gülcan, “Press Freedom Day with 95 Journalists Behind Bars!” BIA Media

Monitoring- News Center (July 25, 2012), available at https://bianet.org/english/freedomof-expression/139915-press-freedom-day-with-95-journalists-behind-bars (accessed
March 8, 2019).

19

Protect Journalists, only 27 reporters were in jail at the end of 1998.45 Reporters without
Borders (RSF) ranked Turkey 148th out of 179 countries on its World Press Freedom
Index, and cited 2011 as the year of “unprecedented arrests, massive phone taps … and
escalating judicial harassment of journalists,” all of which had created “a climate of
intimidation in the media.”46 That was a significant drop from the country’s ranking of
99th in 2002, the year RSF first published its index and the AKP came to power. As of
2018, Turkey had plummeted even further, ranking 157th in the World Press Freedom
Index.47
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In political journalism there is always a symbiotic relationship between journalists
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time periods.48 Ozan Aşık suggests that what distinguishes the AKP-era media
environment is a significant departure from this “interest-based” relationship, which has a
long and asymmetrical history in Turkey, into one with “kinship-like ties and organic
solidarity with the AKP.”49 Through political pressure, legal coercion, and economic
incentives, the AKP has not only established several loyal media outlets, but also
neutralized opposition media since the 2000s.50 As the country became more polarized
and the AKP tightened its control over the media starting in 2011, journalists in Turkey
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began displaying strong allegiance to the AKP’s Islamist-nationalist narratives at the
expense of fair and balanced reporting.51

3. Publicity and Popular Constitution Making
By mid-2011 the AKP had won a landslide victory in the general elections, but lacked the
constitutional mandate to unilaterally draft a new constitution. All political parties had
pledged to a new constitution that should be democratic as well as civilian, and
committed to joining the AKP in the new parliament to write a new constitution. The
media were to play a crucial role in this process of drafting a new constitution in an
inclusive, pluralistic, and positive manner, which would mark a radical departure from
the country’s already divided and AKP-dominated socio-cultural landscape.
At the time, the AKP was enjoying hegemony over the mainstream media, and the
existing political criticism in Turkey’s media environment was still orbiting around the
narratives shaped by the party. As Ali Çarkoğlu and his colleagues demonstrate in the
news coverage of the 2011 elections, opposition media failed to generate enough
publicity for opposition political parties.52 In other words, news outlets critical of the
AKP were not able to provide wide-ranging and effective alternative coverage of
Turkey’s politics at the time. That is, of course, not entirely the media’s fault. As the
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authors rightly acknowledge, the inability of the critical press to spotlight a more
compelling opposition narrative was also due to the fact that no single opposition party
was able to mobilize enough popular support to emerge as a viable alternative to the
AKP. Nonetheless, this particular snapshot illustrates how ill equipped Turkey’s critical
media were in 2011 to cover such a complex and heated topic as the making of a new
constitution.
In the following three sections, I explain how the media coverage of constitution
making shifted from tightly controlled, yet relatively balanced and informative to less
restrained but more partisan. In particular, the year 2013, which overlapped with the Gezi
protests, corruption allegations against the AKP, and the dissolution of the AUK, marked
a watershed in the history of Turkey’s illiberal media. Not only did media control and
censorship—and self-censorship—become undeniably visible post-2013, but they also
took on outlandish proportions.

3.1. The AUK and the Media (October 2011–May 2012)
The AUK held its first meeting on October 19, 2011. The four political parties that were
present in the Parliament at the time were each represented by three members, regardless
of the seat distribution. Cemil Çiçek, then AKP MP and the president of the Parliament,
was to chair the process. The AUK’s decision-making process was based on the
unanimity principle—a rare practice in a political system designed for majoritarianism.
Çiçek echoed the value of seeking consensus on the opening day of the commission. “All
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of us may have a different constitution in mind,” he said. “The tolerance and conciliation
that a new constitution requires may help alleviate the cultural and political polarization
that Turkey has long experienced.”53 Çiçek’s emphasis on the significance of how the
new constitution would be drafted (e.g., seeking consensus, based on tolerance and
conciliation) was a welcome change in a country that was speeding toward an
increasingly authoritarian state order. It also invited scrutiny from various actors,
including the media, in order to hold the AUK accountable to these positive promises.
The AUK, however, began its tenure against the background of a new domestic
crisis. A day before the first meeting, Kurdish militants clashed with the Turkish military,
resulting in the killing of 24 soldiers.54 In response, on October 20, 2011, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan convened a meeting with top media owners and editors to discuss the coverage
of the Kurdish issue. Asking media executives not to “serve the aims of terror by
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knowingly or unknowingly propagandizing,”55 Erdoğan practically issued a “quasi gag
order” on the coverage of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military.56
Erdoğan’s message to the media might appear to be limited to this particular issue;
however, his increased control over media, wrapped around a sensitive national security
claim and an intimidating warning about “knowingly or unknowingly” spreading
propaganda, had a chilling effect on editorial decisions beyond the issue of terror. In
addition, it raised reasonable doubts about how sincere the AUK’s promise to draft a new
constitution in an inclusive manner was in the context of an ongoing armed conflict and
limited freedom of political expression in the media.
Ahead of Erdoğan’s meeting with the press, the AUK was already concerned with
the extent of publicity about the commission’s work. In their very first decision, the
members unanimously decided that the media should not be privy to conversations inside
the meetings. Calling on everyone, including the media, to act “responsibly” during this
new process, Çiçek asked reporters not to write “background” stories about the closed
meetings, and added that he would be talking to the editors-in-chief of major newspapers
about that. “The public should be informed about a constitution drafted in the name of the
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public,” Çiçek then acknowledged, but nonetheless reiterated his instruction that the
media should only cover the official statements of the commission.57 Çiçek was adamant
about the participation of regular citizens, along with members of civil society
organizations, in the process. He just did not want the press to be mediating between the
AUK and the public. Soon the AUK launched a website—www.yenianayasa.gov.tr—not
only to showcase previous constitutional documents, examples from other countries, and
press coverage, but also to facilitate citizen feedback. The AUK also expressed the
intention to use the website to poll public opinion regarding some of the articles of the
new constitution once they were drafted.58
Next, in early November 2011, the AUK convened a meeting at Dolmabahçe
Palace with managers and editors from a wide range of news organizations. Cemil Çiçek,
along with some AUK members from each party, asked the media to “support the work
of the commission, encourage public participation, and advise in case of a deadlock.”59
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There were reportedly thirty-three newspapers (including minority papers), five news
agencies, three magazines, two foreign newspapers, and thirty-one broadcast channels
from a variety of political positions in the room. There were also, however, some notable
omissions, such as the leftist pro-Kurdish publication Özgür Gündem, the Kurdish news
sources Dicle Press Agency and Azadiya Welat, the Greek news source İho, and the
Armenian outlet Marmara.60
After these initial meetings, the AUK kicked off a consultative process that lasted
from October 2011 to April 2012 to capture the wide range of concerns and
recommendations regarding the new constitution. They announced a series of meetings
with a variety of organizations, including universities, unions, political parties, think
tanks, and provincial bar associations. Nearly 10,000 citizens reportedly sent their
recommendations to the AUK.61 This rare process of listening to different interested
parties by all members of the Parliament was perceived to be a positive step toward the
making of a new constitution. Yet it was soon clouded by the AUK’s decision not to
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publish the views and suggestions collected from different organizations. Dubbed the
“secrecy rule” by some monitors of the process, the AUK members defended their
decision on the basis of protecting these groups and preventing further conflict and
polarization over the recommendations.62
The assumption motivating the virtue of publicity in any political process is not
only to hold powerful institutions accountable, but also to create a more effective,
responsive, and democratic regulatory process. In the case of political decision-making,
however, sunlight may not always be the best disinfectant, pace U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis. Jon Elster, for example, suggests that while public deliberations
may help avoid “open logrolling or horsetrading” and encourage arguments in favor of
the common good, they can also push decision makers to adopt “rigid, inflexible
positions as a pre-commitment device,” since it is harder to walk back public statements
than those expressed in closed meetings.63 In that sense, the AUK’s effort to set
limitations on the media, dictate what was newsworthy, and operate in outright secrecy
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seemed to be a genuine attempt to shield the commission from the potentially corrosive
pressure of public opinion. The AUK tried to make up for this democratic deficit by using
the website as a presumably open way to solicit citizen feedback. That was, however, a
highly unsatisfactory substitute for transparency, as the AUK was still at the helm,
deciding what went online or not about the consultations and moderating the online
discussions.
What did the news coverage look like when the AUK was tightly controlling the
public narrative about the new constitution? A content analysis of newspaper reports
from the period between October 19, 2011 and February 2012 shows that the coverage
predominantly focused on Chairman Cemil Çiçek’s statements and the day-to-day work
of the AUK.64 That is perhaps not surprising given the significance of a new constitution,
the radical method of striving to draft it based on consensus and consultation with a wide
range of organizations, and Çiçek’s own commitment to making sure that the media acted
“responsibly” in this process. The coverage was not always sympathetic. The opposition
media criticized the AUK’s decision to keep the meetings closed, with articles bearing
titles such as “The Civilian Constitution is Behind Closed Doors” and “The
Commission’s First Disagreement is about the Chairman” (both in Cumhuriyet) and
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“What Would Happen if Obama Convened Media Representatives?” (in Habertürk).65
Nonetheless, most papers followed the instructions of the AUK, and there was little
coverage of the organizations and groups that provided recommendations.
In hindsight, given Turkey’s polarized political environment at the time and the
already existing pressure on mainstream media, the AUK’s aversion to full transparency
makes sense. Even in more liberal democratic contexts, full transparency in government
can sometimes do more harm than the democratic good it promises to deliver. More
openness may expose decision-makers to powerful and potentially malevolent authorities
or interest groups, thereby inhibiting honest deliberations.66 The glare of publicity may

65

“Sivil Anayasa Kapalı Kapılar Ardında,” Cumhuriyet (October 24, 2011), available at

www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/2011/10/24/5.xhtml (accessed March 8,
2019); “Komisyonda İlk Uzlaşmazlık Başkanlıkta,” Cumhuriyet (October 20, 2011),
available at
www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/gazete_haberleri.haber_detay?pkayit_no=1348251
(accessed March 8, 2019); “Obama Medya Temsilcilerini Toplasa Nasıl Olur?”
Habertürk (October 27, 2011).
66

Michael Schudson, The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of

Transparency, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2015).

30

make it difficult for decision makers to negotiate with each other in candid and creative
ways, especially in political climates marked by drastic partisanship. David Stasavage
offers a game-theoretic justification for limiting transparency, suggesting that open
deliberation has the potential to lead to mass polarization instead of consensus.67
Restricting the work of the media through open warnings, one-on-one meetings, and
withholding internal documents may appear somewhat overbearing even for Turkey,
where some of those practices had become rather normalized by that time. Nonetheless,
the early coverage of the AUK seemed to be more measured and informative, especially
in contrast to the coverage of the commission’s work in late 2012 and 2013. The limited
autonomy of reporters resulted in relatively fewer and shorter stories about the new
constitution, but the reports that were published gave the impression of a more consistent
narrative across various media outlets. As the AUK professed a commitment to working
with civil society organizations and soliciting citizen feedback, the mainstream media’s
regular reporting on the historical significance of making a democratic constitution and
detailed information about the process was just the kind of publicity that the commission
needed at the time.

3.2. The AUK Starts Drafting a New Constitution (June–December 2012)
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The drafting of the new constitution began in May 2012. By June 2012 there was already
not only more media coverage of the commission,68 but also a change in the way the
media covered the AUK.69 While still driven by the work of the AUK and voices of the
commission members (as opposed to civil society actors or minority voices), the media
began to report on the progress of discussions in the commission. For example, the
Gülen-affiliated Zaman newspaper, tightly aligned with the AKP government at the time,
covered the AUK under the special rubric “Constitutional Diary.”70 In the beginning, the
mainstream media remained loyal to the reporting conventions set out by the AUK, even
when initial disagreements inside the commission flared up. Still reporting on the basis of
the official statements put out by the AUK members, newspapers highlighted the content
of debates rather than polarizing narratives, thereby providing “more neutral, informative,
and even positive views.”71
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In July 2012, for example, the commission took a break from regular meetings
due to a deadlock over two issues—the right to education in one’s mother tongue and
inclusion of sexual orientation in the text of the article on equality, both of which were
proposed by the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP). The
ideological orientations of newspapers shaped the headlines; nonetheless, all papers gave
voice to political parties in equal measure in their stories. Zaman, for example, reported
the impasse in an article titled “BDP Presses the Brake on Constitutional Drafting,”72 but
despite blaming the BDP for stalling the commission’s work in the title, the story then
extensively and soberly covered the BDP’s complaint that the party’s considerations were
not taken into account during internal discussions. It also covered Cemil Çiçek’s and
other commission members’ responses, along with updating the readers about the overall
progress of the commission. Cumhuriyet, which is highly critical of AKP, broke the same
news under the headline “A Break on the Crisis of Mother Tongue,”73 and led the story
with a quote from BDP’s Hasip Kaplan: “We will reveal who gets in the way of the
process, but it will never be us who obstructs the process,” thereby demonstrating that
BDP’s critical stance in the commission did not intend to hinder the process. Similar to
Zaman’s story, Cumhuriyet’s version highlighted the critical voices on the commission,
such as members of the CHP and BDP, as well as Cemil Çiçek. Despite the fact that the
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commission postponed its deliberations for a few weeks, newspapers did not escalate the
severity of the situation. “A Break on the New Constitution,” Akşam reported, and
highlighted quotes from each party representative.74 “Mother Tongue Postponed in the
Constitution,” the liberal paper Taraf announced, while dedicating the rest of the story to
the clauses that the commission had completed drafting to that point.75
This balanced and careful tone started shifting, however, as internal
disagreements over specific articles continued into late 2012. At some point, reporters
stopped following the AUK’s earlier instruction not to cover the closed meetings or
provide background stories. Even in countries where there is more press freedom, the
media usually “patrol the boundaries of culture and keep discord within conventional
bounds,”76 and it is only when there is disagreement among elites that reporters deviate
from dominant frames.77 The Turkish media were much less experienced in taking a
proactive, critical role that goes beyond the official frame of any story. When the AUK
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stopped presenting a united front, media coverage started splintering and rendering the
public narrative in line with the various outlets’ ideological loyalties.78 In other words,
pro-government and opposition media chose which of the AUK’s proceedings to cover
on the basis of their political leanings, limited their sources to those who agreed with the
views of the outlet, and framed the actual negotiations in a highly biased manner, again,
in support of their political stance.79
Take what happened in September 2012, when the commission weathered another
predicament over constitutional secularism, which secures freedom of religious
expression and conscience.80 Cumhuriyet chose to cover this debate with the exaggerated
headline “Open Door for Sharia,” and narrowed the overall discussion to the issue of
state secularism, that is, the principle that a state does not govern according to religious
laws.81 Pro-AKP Sabah, in contrast, reported on the same day, “Atheists are in the New
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Constitution,” and summed up the complicated discussion about religious freedom with
reference to only one of the settled terms among commission members, the one that
recognized the right not to believe.82 Relatively more moderate Akşam headlined their
story “Agreement on the Constitutional Guarantee for Atheists,” but then covered the
whole debate over freedom of religion and conscience, especially regarding the impasse
between the AKP and the CHP over the redefinition of secularism.83
Popular constitution making could have been a significant step toward
democratization in Turkey, but it also offered a rare opportunity for Turkey’s media,
however repressed it was at the time, to report on a parliamentary commission that
purportedly operated on the principle of consensus seeking and not one of deep
polarization. Civil society organizations that monitored the constitution-making process
expected this moment to be a “significant turning point” for the media to take on a more
active role, and overall seemed disappointed with the fact that the press merely
“reflect[ed] views, rather than endeavoring to provide guidance, contribute to the debate,
and offer information.”84 Ideally, journalists should of course help people connect the
dots, offer explanations, and give voice to multiple perspectives. Informative, multi-
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perspectival, and critical media have the potential to expose the public to competing
interpretations, thereby encouraging citizens to think about the political situation in more
complex and original ways.85
Civil society’s expectations of the media, however, may have been unrealistic.
Not only did they overlook the immense pressure that was looming over Turkey’s media
industry, but also the fact that journalists, even in more liberal contexts, rarely attempt to
influence outcomes. Rather, reporters try to protect and advance their careers in line with
what they imagine to be the ideal role ascribed to them, whether as independent
watchdogs in a relatively liberal context or as guardians of the unity of the country in a
more illiberal environment.86 Between 2011 and 2013, the ideal roles Turkey’s media
took upon themselves were in flux, and there was still some room for negotiation and
editorial discretion inside newsrooms. The AUK’s initial meetings with members of civil
society and attempts to control coverage through official statements offered journalists an
opportunity to practice the profession in a way they had not had much of a chance to do
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lately, that is, more independently. Most newspapers, in response, managed to cover only
what was happening (as opposed to providing interpretations and background stories of
events), give voice to each political party in equal measure, and report on conflicts in a
balanced manner, albeit for a short period of time. Once the commission’s unity began to
shatter, journalists’ accounts of the new constitution mirrored the news coverage of other
subjects: conflicting, not to mention polarizing, stories.
Toward the end of 2012, media coverage of the AUK started to focus on the
commission’s timeline, along with a critical interrogation of the durability of the overall
process as political disagreements persisted. In early November 2012, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan announced that he was losing hope for a new constitution. This not only
received wide coverage, but also validated negative assessments of the odds of the
commission’s ultimate success in drafting a new constitution.87 Erdoğan’s statement also
invited responses from leaders of other political parties, thereby shifting media attention
from members of the AUK to outsiders. Once the AKP proposed drafting the clauses on
the executive body in order to constitutionalize a presidential system, both the inner
dynamics of the commission and the overall coverage of the new constitution changed
drastically.
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3.3. The AUK Fails as Turkey’s Media Scene Further Deteriorates (January–
December 2013)
Starting in early 2013, when the AUK’s internal unity continued to disintegrate from
disagreements and quarrels, the readers of pro-AKP and opposition media were regaled
with polarizing interpretations of the AUK’s discussions and widely divergent expert
opinions. One thing, however, united the coverage of the AKP-friendly and opposition
press: Erdoğan’s pronouncements, which became ever more prominent in the debate on
the new constitution in early 2013. After he signaled the possibility of a constitutional
referendum on the work of the AUK, which had already fallen behind schedule in
completing a draft constitution, Erdoğan published an op-ed in AKP-friendly Sabah in
February 2013. The title read “A New Constitution for a New Turkey,” and the thenprime minister reiterated his party’s commitment to a more democratic constitution and
proclaimed that the AKP would not be “the party that leaves the table.”88 Despite this
reassurance, word of the AKP’s intention to unilaterally draft a new constitution began to
spread (see, for example, “Constitution Draft Will Be Rewritten”),89 and the news
media’s focus soon shifted to openly questioning how much longer the AUK could
survive, as signaled by headlines such as “Judgment Day for the Constitution,” “The Ball
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is in the Court of Political Parties,” and “There is No Point in Staying at the Table
without Progress.”90
In the following few months, while the commission’s work slowed down, media
coverage shifted to a variety of debates spurred by external actors—politicians, party
leaders, and legal experts—with rare mention of commission members or of Cemil Çiçek.
Speculation about what would happen if the AUK could not finish drafting the new
constitution started circulating (“AKP’s Plan B is to ‘settle’ with CHP,” “A Transition
Constitution is on the Agenda,” “Semi-Presidency with a Mini Package”).91 And even
when the AUK tried to pick up the pace of its work in May 2013, party representatives
outside the commission openly expressed their doubts about its future in a manner
intended to polarize. Media coverage, in line with the political leanings of the various
newspapers, followed suit. “CHP Wants the Commission to Continue to Derail the New
Constitution,” headlined the pro-AKP, Gülen-affiliated Zaman in early May in a story
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about whether or not the AUK would continue its work.92 “AKP Knocks Down the
Table” announced the opposition paper Cumhuriyet in a story about how the parties were
blaming each other for the delay in the drafting of the new constitution.93
As if the current political climate were not divisive enough, what started as a
couple dozen activists occupying Istanbul’s Gezi Park in late May 2013 turned into a
wave of anti-government protests across the country. The Gezi protests became a critical
moment in pushing Turkey’s media into the spotlight. In its early days, the protests were
either painted by pro-government media organizations as the work of a Western
conspiracy or completely ignored by mainstream media. The now widely remembered
breaking point was when the local CNN affiliate CNN Türk chose to show a documentary
about penguins at the peak of the protests, while CNN International covered the protests
as major breaking news from Turkey. The penguin thus became a symbol of media
cowardice, while dozens of protestors organized sit-ins outside news organizations where
they chanted “sell-out media,” waved money at the media buildings, and circulated a
popular hashtag on Twitter (#korkakmedya—“coward media”) to express their
discontent.94
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Many reporters and editors lost their jobs in the wake of Gezi. The Turkish
Journalists’ Union revealed that 59 journalists were sacked or forced to resign due to their
coverage of the protests, while some reporters cited much higher numbers.95 NTV Tarih, a
history magazine owned by NTV, was shut down and its entire staff was fired after the
magazine prepared to launch a special “Gezi” issue. Even after the protests waned, firings
of journalists continued. In November 2013, TRT fired two employees who voiced their
support for Gezi on Twitter.96 In December 2013, leaks of telephone conversations of top
AKP government officials resulted in a corruption scandal, with the arrests of several
public officials and businesspeople. The investigations eventually caused the notorious
fallout between the AKP and the Gülen movement, which was widely believed to have
instigated the probe. The scandal not only stoked further polarization in media coverage,
but also revealed the bluntness of the government’s control over the media. In one of the
wiretapped leaks, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan was heard to order an executive of
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Habertürk to remove content at the height of the Gezi protests. In response, the editor-inchief of Habertürk daily, Fatih Altaylı, acknowledged the intimidation reporters faced
from government pressure. “The honor of journalism is being trampled on,” he said.
“Instructions rain down every day from various places. Can you write what you want?
Everybody is afraid.”97 Between the Gezi Park protests and the December 2013
corruption scandal, the AUK, for all intents and purposes, collapsed, especially once the
AKP members—including the chairman, Cemil Çiçek—stopped attending the meetings
in November 2013.
The Gezi protests and corruption allegations not only demonstrated the AKP’s
heavy-handed control over the press, but also pushed the government, especially thenPrime Minister Erdoğan, to declare an open war against critical journalism and social
media. In the run-up to Turkey’s local elections in 2014, he threatened at a rally to “wipe
out Twitter.” Immediately after his speech, Twitter was blocked for two weeks by a court
order.98 When the Constitutional Court ruled that the ban on Twitter violated freedom of
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expression, Erdoğan begrudgingly acknowledged that they had to follow the ruling, but
he did not respect the Court’s decision. The following year AKP could not win a
parliamentary majority in the June 2015 general elections, and a two-year-old ceasefire
between Turkey and the PKK collapsed in July. Amid the intensifying political crisis, the
censorship of news outlets reached a whole new level. Turkey’s now-defunct
Telecommunications and Communications Authority (Telekomünikasyon İletişim
Başkanlığı, TİB) blocked nearly 100 Kurdish websites, most of which were news outlets,
on the grounds that they were spreading terrorist propaganda.99 The daily Hürriyet faced
a legal investigation for publishing photos of dead soldiers and an interview with an
alleged PKK militant. An angry mob attacked the Hürriyet offices a couple of weeks
later, accusing the paper of misquoting Erdoğan. The heightened nationalist sentiment
afforded the AKP a clear majority in the snap elections of late 2015, and also enabled
effective criminalization of journalism that does not toe the line of the government’s
narrative.
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A failed coup attempt and a series of terror attacks in 2016 resulted in a massive
purge of public employees, members of civil society, and academics accused of having
connections to terror groups such as Fethullah Gülen’s network and PKK. A total of 131
media outlets were shut down due to alleged links to the Fethullahist Terrorist
Organization (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ).100 Instituting a state of emergency for
two years after the coup attempt, the government was able to rule by decree and shut
down newspapers, detain or charge critical journalists and media owners, restrict access
to official meetings, and ban reporting of certain issues by official decree. Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, and other social media services were briefly blocked or throttled on
multiple occasions.
It was against this backdrop that Turkey held a referendum in April 2017 on
several proposed amendments to the 1982 Constitution, most of which granted sweeping
new powers to the president, thereby changing the country from a parliamentary
democracy to a hyper-presidential system. In the run-up to the referendum, the “Yes”
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campaign received disproportionately wide and positive coverage across the media, while
the “No” campaigners were repeatedly slandered and censored.101
In early 2018 one of the major media companies in the country, Doğan Media
Group, which owned Hürriyet, was sold to the AKP-friendly Demirören Group.102
According to Erol Önderoğlu, a Turkish representative of Reporters Without Borders,
this sale ensured that the government would now control “more than 85 percent of
national mainstream media.”103 While there is still a bit of space for critical voices, these
few publications are struggling financially and reporting under the routine threat—and
reality—of prosecution. Turkey has submitted more legal requests to remove content or
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withhold accounts on Twitter since 2014 than any other country, according to Twitter’s
annual transparency report.104 The government also passed new laws in 2018 to control
and curb content on the internet, to which many in the country now turn in order to
follow critical reporting.105

4. Conclusions
“Journalists as a species, whether working in democracies or in autocratic states,”
suggests media sociologist Michael Schudson, “aspire to independent reporting and
commentary on current affairs.”106 Reporters in Turkey’s illiberal media environment—
predicated upon clientelistic relations, political instrumentalization, and (self-)
censorship—discovered a short-lived opportunity to enjoy somewhat independent
reporting and commentary in late 2011 and early 2012, when the AUK embarked on
writing a new constitution. Ironically, journalists were able briefly to indulge solely in
documenting facts, covering all sides of a political disagreement, and offering an evenhanded framing of events because the commission, chiefly its chairman Cemil Çiçek, set
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the ground rules for covering this process firmly from the outset. The limited
transparency of the commission, along with its controlling attitude toward the press, may
seem to contradict the original spirit of the AUK, which intended to be democratic and
inclusive. Yet the commission’s attempt to police the boundaries of journalistic work by
putting together a media advisory council, routinely convening with editors and reporters,
and sufficiently supplying the media with enough narratives about the terms of the debate
inside the AUK enabled Turkey’s mainstream media to offer the basic form of
accountability in democratic politics: reporting on facts in a straightforward and balanced
manner.
The significance of the AUK’s check on media coverage became clearer when the
narrative of popular constitution making drastically changed between the end of 2012 and
November 2013, when the commission was effectively dissolved. The partisan
fragmentation of the media landscape, along with increasing government pressure,
resulted in highly polarizing and, in some cases, conflicting news stories about the
constitutional debates. As more political voices outside of the AUK, especially top party
officials and then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, began to comment on specific articles, the
coverage became more divisive, and complex debates were reduced to ideologically
driven sound bites. In more independent media environments, when government officials
are less unified in their views on public issues, journalists use these disagreements to
offer a variety of differentiated opinions and analyses of political decision-making
processes. Yet in Turkey’s illiberal media environment, which markedly deteriorated
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from 2013 onward, the inter-elite conflict over the new constitution greatly limited the
work of journalists, who had to walk a very careful line as the AKP government’s
practices reached new levels of authoritarianism around the same time.
This analysis of Turkey’s attempt at popular constitution making and the media’s
limited role in the process calls into question the inherent normative value of some of the
deeply held assumptions about liberal democratic processes, transparency, the media, and
publicity. First, as the AUK’s control over the media narrative at the beginning of the
constitution making indicates, limited transparency may lead to more informative and fair
coverage of political discussions. Second, more voices in public debates do not
automatically translate into multi-perspectival news coverage, especially when reporters
operate in an illiberal, polarizing media environment. Third, attempts to include citizen
feedback and civil society input in political processes, especially via media publicity, risk
disintegrating into a series of opposing monologues motivated by different political
agendas instead of generating a popular dialogue and a back-and-forth negotiation of
competing ideas. Rather than rejecting the value of transparency, diversity, or
participation in popular constitution making as mediated by journalism, Turkey’s case
underscores that, without the backing of formal, independent institutions and the rule of
law, these ideals are not infallibly a democratizing influence. As Walter Lippman
famously asserted, “The press is no substitute for institutions.”107
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